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AVENAL v. UNITED STATES: DOES THE STATE
OF LOUISIANA HAVE A PROPERTY INTEREST
IN THE SALINITY OF ITS WATERS?
Douglas F Britton*

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Federal Claims recently found that
certain leaseholders of oyster beds in Louisiana hold no compensable
property interest in the salinity of the waters above their leased acreage.'
The deciding issue, one of first impression, was whether the leaseholders
derived from the state a vested interest in an artificially high level of
salinity, caused by a federal flood control project,2 such that a subsequent
project3 reestablishing a low level of salinity, would amount to a
compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.4 By deciding the state
did not acquire a property interest in the salinity condition before leasing
the oyster beds, the court was able to dismiss the takings claim upon

* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1997.
1. Avenal v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 778 (1995).
2. The case was before the court upon motion for summary judgment by the
defendant government. Although the defendant argued thatpast projects by both the state
and federal government were involved, the court adopted the plaintiffs' contention that
the artificial salinity level was primarily the result of federal levee projects in the region
of the plaintiffs' leaseholds, thereby giving the plaintiffs the "benefit of 'all applicable
presumptions, inferences, and intendments.'" Id. at 786, n.10 (quoting H.F. Allen
Orchards v. United States, 749 F.2d 1571, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
818 (1985)).
3. On October 27, 1965, Congress enacted the Flood Control Act of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-298, 79 Stat. 1073 (1965), authorizing certain fresh water diversion projects
in the Lower Mississippi River Basin, including (under section 204) the freshwater
diversion project that allegedly resulted in a taking of the plaintiffs' property. Avenal
v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. at 779.
4. Id. at 787.
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summary judgment, thus avoiding the need for a complete takings
analysis. 5
This Note analyzes the wisdom of the court's approach in Avenal v.
United States, and, while approving of the noncompensability of any

private property interest in the artificially created salinity level, argues
that the court did not completely address the nature of the property
interest in question. This Note will then argue that the noncompens-

ability of the plaintiffs' interest would have been better explained under
the navigation servitude, which will be briefly described and then be

shown to apply to the factual circumstances of the case. Finally, it will
be argued that the holding of Avenal v. United States is inconsistent with
the public trust doctrine in Louisiana, and that an alternative holding

under the navigation servitude would have prevented this inconsistency
and would have allowed recognition of the state's continuing public trust

interest in its coastal waters.
II. A VENAL V. UNITED STATES
A. Facts
Section 204 of the Flood Control Act of 19656 authorized the federal
government to construct fresh water diversion structures in the Breton
Sound Basin of Louisiana, where the plaintiffs hold leaseholds for oyster
farming.' Historically, the location of the plaintiffs' leases had been
unfavorable for oyster growth.8 However, by the early 1960s, primarily
as a result of a federal flood control project,9 the natural salinity

5. The court stated, "for a takings claim to succeed under the Fifth Amendment,
under either a physical invasion or regulatory takings theory, a claimant must first
establish a compensable property interest." Id. at 784-785 (citing Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-1030, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2899-2900
(1992)).
6. Pub. L. No. 89-298, 79 Stat. 1073, 1076 (1965) (modifying and expanding the
Flood Control Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-391, 45 Stat. 534 (1928)).
7. Specifically, section 204 adopted and authorized H.R. Doc. No. 308, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1965), giving the location and description of the fresh water diversion
structures. Avenal v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. at 779.
8. The optimal salinity level for oyster growth ranges from 5 parts per thousand
to 15 parts per thousand, and, for various reasons, oysters cannot survive in salinity
levels beyond this range. Historically, the salinity of the waters existing over the
plaintiffs' leaseholds fell below this range. Id.
9. Id. at 780.
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conditions of the Breton Sound Basin were unexpectedly altered. This

change in salinity fostered new oyster growth in the landward region of
the basin which had previously been too fresh to sustain oyster growth.'
Beginning in the 1970s, many persons in the oyster industry, including
the plaintiffs, recognized the change in the salinity conditions and entered
into water-bottom lease agreements with the Louisiana Wildlife and

Fisheries Commission."
While the alteration of salinity patterns had the beneficial effect of
creating new oyster grounds in the landward end of the Breton Sound
Basin, the change also had the detrimental effect of creating unacceptably

high levels of salinity within the seaward end of the basin, where
extensive areas of traditionally productive oyster grounds were rendered
unusable.' In 1959, prompted by the requests of local groups and after
investigation, the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of Interior
concluded that introducing fresh water would be the most effective
method of restoring fish and wildlife production in the seaward end of
the basin.'

After a considerable length of time,' 4 a single fresh water diversion
structure at Caernarvon, Louisiana was constructed in February 1991.5

10. Id.
11. The leases covered a maximum of 1,000 acres and had a term of fifteen years.
Id. at 781. In 1976, the Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Commission changed the
generalprovisions of the lease agreements to include the following language: "This lease
is also subject to Commission policies not stipulated by regulations . . . ." Id. n.6
(citing Def's Proposed Findings of Fact No. 73, filed Feb. 7, 1995). Between 1988 and
1990 the leases were further modified to include a hold-harmless clause that prevented
leaseholders from seeking damages from the state for losses arising from fresh water
diversion projects. According to the defendant, leases issued before 1988 were not
amended to include a hold-harmless clause. Id.
12. d. at 781.
13. The conclusions of the investigation and a description of the recommended
fresh water diversion projects were part of a 1959 memorandum from the United States
Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service to the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers. Id. at 779. The memorandum was incorporated into H.R. Doe. No. 308,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965), which Congress approved in the Flood Control Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-298, § 204, 79 Stat. 1073, 1074 (1965).
14. Considerable time was spent in allowing for interactions between local and state
agencies, and in allowing for various public hearings to provide additional input. Avenal
v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. at 780-781.
15. Id. at 782. The Army Corps of Engineers issued a final report in 1982 that
sanctioned a single fresh water diversion structure at Caernarvon, even though the Flood
Control Act of 1965 had originally authorized a plan for two diversion structures. Id.
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On April 26, 1994, numerous owners of water-bottom leases filed a
takings claim in the United States Court of Federal Claims 6 alleging that

the Caernarvon diversion structure diminished the salinity level of the
waters above the plaintiffs' leaseholds, thereby preventing the cultivation
of their oyster beds.' 7 The government moved for summary judgment,
asserting that the plaintiffs held no compensable property interest in the
artificially created salinity level of the waters above their leaseholds."5

B. The Court's Analysis
1.

The Takings Claim on Summary Judgment

After noting that the parties did not dispute the essential facts of the
case the court proceeded to evaluate the validity of the plaintiffs' takings
claim.' 9 The court invoked Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council2"
for the proposition that a successful physical or regulatory takings claim
depends on the existence of a compensable property interest. 2'

at 781. Congress authorized funds for the Caernarvon diversion structure under the
Fiscal Year 1987 Energy and Water Development and Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
99-591, 100 Stat. 3341, 3341-195 (1986). Avenal v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. at 782.
16. Id. The court noted that:
Plaintiffs also filed a motion for class certification ... seeking to certify as a
class hundreds of oyster lessees of water bottoms in the vicinity of the Breton
Sound Basin whose leases had been impaired by the activity of the Federal
Government through the Caernarvon project. There are 130 named plaintiffs
in the action ....
Id. at 783. However, the court deferred decision on the motion. Id.
17. Id. at 782; U.S. CONST. amend. V. The plaintiffs' claim for a physical taking
was unique because it was founded upon alleged physical damage to the salinity level of
the waters above their submerged leasehold, which is distinguishable from other takings
claims which have been based upon alleged physical damage to the submerged land itself.
See, e.g., Lewis Blue Point Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
18. Avenal v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. at 783.
19. The court noted that: "[A]lthough '[t]he fact-intensive nature of just
compensation jurisprudence to date . . . argues against precipitous grants of summary
judgment. . . . [t]here [are] cases in which the United States as a moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and where it is quite clear what the truth
is ....
' Id. at 784 (quoting Yuba Goldfields, Inc. v. United States, 723 F.2d 884, 887
(Fed. Cir. 1983)).
20. 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-1030 (1992).
21. Avenal v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. at 784.
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The court then emphasized that not all economic interests are actual
or compensable property rights. Under United States v. Willow River
Power Co.' and Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York,'
only those interests that have the "'law back of them'" are compensable
property rights.' For an example of such noncompensable interests, the
court looked again to Willow River Power Co., which found that a
dominant public right to navigation precluded a riparian land owner from
acquiring a compensable property interest in the high-water level of a
navigable riverY
After noting Willow River Power Co.'s restriction of property rights
affected by the navigation servitude, the court proceeded to set forth the
necessary elements of its analysis under Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal
Council.' The court found that it must first evaluate the plaintiffs'
"bundle of rights" at the time they acquired their leases, and that second
it must examine "'existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law' to define the range of interests that
qualify for protection as 'property' under the Fifth (and Fourteenth)
Amendments."27 Although the court purported to apply both prongs of
this test to determine the validity of the plaintiffs' interest, only the first
element was directly addressed.
The court began by deciding that the plaintiffs' right to income under
their leases is a valid property interest as defined by state law.' The
court then moved to the second prong of the test to determine whether

22. 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
23. 438 U.S. 104, 124-125 (1978).
24. Avenal v. United States, 33 Fed. C1. at 785 (citing United States v. Willow
River Power Co., 324 U.S. at 502).
25. Avenal v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. at 785 (citing United States v. Willow
River Power Co., 324 U.S. at 511). The court also cited Lewis Blue Point Oyster
Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. at 87-88, which found that an owner of submerged
lands holds title subject to a dominant public right of navigation, and rejected the
claimant's takings claim under the navigation servitude. See discussion of "navigation
servitude" infra part IHI.
26. Avenal v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. at 785.

27. Id. (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1027,
1030).
28. Id. at 786 (citing Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S.
at 87 (owner or lessee of submerged lands has property right to uses of such lands that
do not obstruct navigation); referencing also 767 Third Avenue Associates v. United
States, 48 F.3d 1575, 1578 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (individual's right to income under
lease constitutes property under the Fifth Amendment)).
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the plaintiffs' leasehold property interest was noncompensable due to
"the nature of the res that is being leased." 29
The court answered this query by first addressing the plaintiffs'
expectancy interests, under state law, in the continued artificial salinity
condition of the waters directly above their leaseholds. ° Relying on the
plaintiffs' admission that the terms of the lease do not address any
leasehold interest in the quality of water above the oyster beds, the court
concluded, without reference to precedent, that "based on state law,
plaintiffs hold no compensable expectancy in the salinity of the waters
above their leased acreage."31
Notwithstanding this conclusion, the court continued by focusing on
whether the plaintiffs could have received from the state a vested interest
in the salinity condition.' Thus, the court had neatly disposed of the
second prong of its analysis, concerning the use of state law to define
protected property interests, and focused instead on whether the state
acquired a vested interest in the salinity condition.3 3 This presented the
court with a question of first impression: "[W]hether the plaintiffs have
a vested right, derived from the state, in an unintended benefit resulting
from a federal government project, such that a cessation of that benefit,
due to the consequences of a separate federal project, warrants compensation under the Fifth Amendment."'
The court then sought to
determine whether the leaseholders could have derived from the state an
interest resulting from an unintended benefit, thereby concentrating the
weight of its analysis on the first prong of its test, concerning what rights
could have been acquired by the plaintiffs.35 By defining the contested
interest in terms of benefit, or by its pecuniary effect, the court obscured

29. Avenal v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. at 787.
30. Id.
31. Id. The court made no attempt to evaluate "the nature of the res" before
reaching this conclusion, nor did the court provide any authority to support its
construction of the lease. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. The court's characterization of the salinity condition as an unintended
benefit is appropriate considering the consequences which it has for the plaintiffs' oyster
beds, but it may be argued that relative to the inquiry of the state's interest, the condition
was part of a greater physical change in salinity patterns which may be better described
as a harm, resulting in deleterious economic and ecological consequences for the entire
seaward region of the Breton Sound Basin.
35. Id. at 787-790.
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the physical nature of the salinity condition which was at the heart of the
plaintiffs' claim.36
2. Noncompensable Interests in Unintended Benefits
To decide the "bundle of rights" question the court began by
discussing whether analogous property interests can be derived from
federal programs. Although the court noted the noncompensable nature

of the cessation of benefits derived from government entitlement
programs,' it acknowledged that the analogy is imperfect." Undaunted,
the court offered the relative benefits doctrine as another "loosely
analogous" principle, by which the government is not required to

compensate for damages to private property when the action "'confers
great benefits when measured in the whole.'" 39 The court recognized
that this analogy is also imperfect, stating that "the doctrine is inapplicable" due to factual considerations in Avenal.'
Finally, acknowledging that "the case law is of marginal assistance,"
the court turned to the factual circumstances of the case to determine the
"nature of the federal government-conferred benefit."41 The court

reasoned that compensation was not required because the benefit
conferred had historically been considered problematic and artificial, and
because the federal government had taken steps to remedy the problem

36. The plaintiffs maintained that the Caernarvon diversion structure resulted in a
physical taking of their water-bottom leases. Id.at 785.
37. Id. at 788. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 604-605 (1987) ("Congress
is not, by virtue of having instituted a social welfare program, bound to continue
it. . . ."); Richardsonv. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971) ("Mhe analogy drawn...
between social welfare and 'property'... cannot be stretched to impose a constitutional
limitation on the power of Congress to make substantive changes in the law of
entitlement to public benefits.") (citation omitted); Allred v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl.
349, 356 (1995) ("[R]ecipients of government benefits generally do not have a
substantive property right to have these benefits continue.") (citation omitted).
38. The court recognized that the property interests of the plaintiffs, unlike the
interests of entitlement recipients, are ultimately founded upon a leasehold interest
created by the state. Avenal v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. at 788-789.
39. Id. at 789. (quoting United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 266-267
(1939)).
40. Id. The court noted that the application of the relative benefits doctrine
requires extensive factual determinations, and that the facts necessary for the doctrine are
contested and not ripe for adjudication.
41. Id.
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soon after it developed.42 Thus, the court used a factual inquiry, based
on the historical perceptions of the salinity condition, to decide that the
state acquired no property interest which it could subsequently convey in

the salinity level of the waters above the plaintiffs' leaseholds.43
III. THE NAVIGATION SERVITUDE
A. A Brief Survey

The navigation servitude is derived from the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution," and is a manifestation of the principle
that "the determination of whether a taking has occurred must take into
consideration the important public interest" in the nation's navigable
waters.45 If Congress, in a proper exercise of the navigation power,4"
burdens expectation interests in private property, compensation may not
be constitutionally required where the burdened expectations were held
subject to the dominant public right to navigation47 as protected under the
navigation servitude.48 This principle gives rise to the "rule of no
compensation," under which Congress may "destroy or impair with
impunity certain private rights and values in water courses,"" according
to the theory that the owner never had a compensable private property
right to begin with."

42. Id. at 790.
43. Id.
44. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
45. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177 (1979); United States v.
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 71-72 (1913); Lewis Blue Point Oyster
Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. at 87-88. A complete survey of the navigation
servitude is beyond the scope of this Note; for a comprehensive treatment, see, e.g., Eva
H. Morreale, FederalPowers in Western Waters: The Navigation Power and the Rule of
No Compensation, 3 NAT. RES. J. 1 (1963).
46. The origin of the navigation power demands that one purpose of the
government act must be to protect or improve navigation. Morreale, supra note 45, at
11.
47. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. at 87.
48. Gilbert L. Finnell, Jr., Public Access to Coastal Public Property: Judicial
Theories and the Takings Issue, 67 N.C. L. REv. 627, 666 (1989).
49. Morreale, supra note 45, at 19-20.
50. Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. at 681.

1996]

Avenal v. United States

Historically, the courts have given Congress substantial scope to
exercise its navigation power." While the proper exercise of the
navigation power demands that one purpose of the government act must
be to protect or improve navigation, other interests may also be served. 2
As the Supreme Court has stated: "[T]hat purposes other than navigation
will also be served could not invalidate the exercise of the authority
conferred, even if those other purposes would not alone have justified an
exercise of Congressional power."53
In United States v. AppalachianElectric PoFiver Co.,' Oklahoma v.
Atkinson, 5 and United States v. Grand River Dam Authority,56 the
Supreme Court upheld flood control and water development projects as
constitutionally valid exercises of the navigation power in the interest of
navigation. In this context, the Supreme Court has stated that there is no
"constitutional necessity" for viewing each project "in isolation from a
comprehensive plan covering the entire basin of a particular river. "I
Considerable deference has been allowed to Congress in the judicial
review of the exercise of the navigation power.5" In United States v.
Twin City Power Co., the Court held:
It is not for courts, however, to substitute their judgments for
congressional decisions on what is or is not necessary for the
improvement or the protection of navigation .... The decision
of Congress that this project will serve the interests of navigation involves engineering and policy considerations for Congress
and Congress alone to evaluate.59
Thus, the Court plays essentially no role in the determination of what
projects serve the interests of navigation, and it has limited itself to
accepting the perfunctory declarations made by Congress with regard to
navigation.'
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Morreale, supra note 45, at 11.
Id.
Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 456 (1931).
311 U.S. 377 (1940).
313 U.S. 508 (1941).
363 U.S. 228 (1960).
Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 U.S. at 525.
Morreale, supra note 45, at 12-14.
United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224 (1956) (citations

omitted).
60. Morreale, supra note 45, at 17.
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B. Applying the Navigation Servitude to Avenal v. United States

The court in Avenal rejected the plaintiffs' takings claim without
completely addressing the nature of the property interest under state
law,61 and found that the state never acquired a property interest in the
salinity of the waters above the plaintiffs' leaseholds.'
Alternatively, the court could have recognized the important state
interest which exists in the physical nature of its waters and yet could
have defeated the plaintiffs' takings claim, for the particular government
action at issue, under the navigation servitude. Moreover, under the
navigation servitude, the court could have rejected the takings claim
without any examination of state interest in the salinity condition, thereby
eliminating any risk of conflict with Louisiana's public trust doctrine.
As it stands, the court's decision may have undesirable implications for
state interests in navigable waters, primarily because it disregards the
public trust interests which should exist in the physical condition of
salinity as an important characteristic of coastal waters.'
As a project authorized by the Flood Control Act of 1965, 4 the
Caernarvon diversion project is a constitutionally valid exercise of the
navigation power because the Act expressly declared that projects

61. The court did make reference to A-B Cattle Company v. United States, 621
F.2d 1099 (Ct. Cl. 1980), which held that under Colorado law a riparian landowner did
not have a property right to silty water, to support the proposition that "[s]alinity may
be construed as a benefit outside the property, like fish in the sea, and therefore
compensation is not warranted." Avenal v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. at 790. However,
the rationale of A-B Cattle Company v. United States was premised upon the finding of
the Colorado Supreme Court that, under Colorado state law, there could be no property
interest in silty water. Because the court in Avenal v. United States did not determine
that there can be no property interest in salinity under Louisiana state law, the reliance
upon A-B Cattle Company v. United States can only be described as erroneous.
Furthermore, the court's recognition of salinity as a physical characteristic of water is
incongruous with its ultimate reliance upon a factual inquiry concerning the salinity
condition as an unintended economic benefit.
62. Avenal v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. at 790.
63. "The court holds that the state acquired no property interest in the salinity level
of the waters above the plaintiffs' leased grounds. Plaintiffs therefore also hold no
compensable expectancy in the salinity." Id. Conflict with the public trust doctrine is
discussed infra Part IV.
64. Pub. L. No. 89-298, 79 Stat. 1073 (1965).
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completed under the Act benefitted navigation;' such a Congressional
finding' is essentially treated by the courts as non-reviewable.
Furthermore, as a means of effectuating the objectives of a prior flood
control project, and as a component of an overall flood control project
for the entire Lower Mississippi River Basin, the constitutional validity

of the Caernarvon diversion structure as a proper exercise of the
navigation power would be supported under UnitedStates v. Appalachian
Power Co., Oklahoma v. Atkinson, and United States v. Grand River

Dam Authority. I
Therefore, the plaintiffs' private property interest is burdened by a
proper exercise of the navigation power and their takings claim would be
defeated under the no compensation rule of the navigation servitude.69
This analysis would be harmonious with the court's utilization of Willow
River Power Co., which was decided under the navigation servitude, as

an example of when a property interest is noncompensable for purposes
of the Fifth Amendment.

65. Section204 provides that "[tihe following works of improvement for the benefit
of navigation and the control of destructive floodwaters and other purposes are hereby
adopted and authorized." Id. § 204, 79 Stat. at 1074.
66. The court noted that "It]he Caernarvon project was designed not only to abate
salt water intrusion, but also to abate marine tidal invasion." Avenal v. United States,
33 Fed. Cl. at 782.
67. Morreale, supranote 45, at 19; but see United States v. Twin City Power Co.,
350 U.S. at 224 (when considering Congressional determination that the purpose of a
project is to benefit navigation, "[c]ourts should respect that decision until and unless it
is shown to 'involve an impossibility,' as Mr. Justice Holmes expressed it"). Thus, the
possibility remains that there would be an insufficient nexus between the diversion
structure and the declared purpose relating to navigation.
68. See supranotes 54-57 and accompanying text.
69. Finnell, supranote 48, at 666.
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IV. AVOIDING CONFLICT WITH THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

The essential defect with the court's rationale is that its analysis of
the state's interest conflicts with public trust jurisprudence, 0 and with the
state constitution and civil code of Louisiana. Illinois CentralRailroad
Co. v. Illinois,7 1 generally regarded as the seminal case for public trust
jurisprudence in America,7 2 found that upon entering the union, the
people of each state "'became themselves sovereign, and in that character
hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under
them, for their own common use, subject only to the rights since
surrendered by the Constitution to the general government.'" 73 The
Supreme Court of Louisiana adopted this language in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
State MineralBoard,4 thereby giving clear recognition of the public trust
doctrine in Louisiana.
The Louisiana Supreme Court revisited the public trust doctrine in
5
Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control Commission,"
where the court noted that a "public trust for the protection, conservation
and replenishment of all natural resources of the state was recognized by

70. While this Note argues that the rationale of Avenal v. United States is
inconsistent with public trust jurisprudence, it does not purport to explain the public trust
doctrine, for which a considerable body of literature has developed. For a more
complete treatment of the public trust doctrine in Louisiana, see James G. Wilkins &
Michael Wascom, The Public Trust Doctrine in Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REv. 861 (1992);
Robert E. Tarcza, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Basisfor Environmental
Litigation in Louisiana, 27 LoY. L. REv. 469 (1981); Nelea A. Absher, Note,
Constitutional Law and the Environment: Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana
Environmental Control Commission, 59 Tun. L. REv. 1557 (1985). For a general
treatment of the public trust doctrine, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REv. 471 (1970)
[hereinafter The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law]; Joseph L. Sax,
Liberating The Public Trust Doctrinefrom Its HistoricalShackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 185 (1980); Bernard S. Cohen, The Constitution, The Public Trust Doctrine, and
the Environment, 1970 UTAH L. Rev. 388; Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A
Sovereign's Ancient PrerogativeBecomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 195 (1980).
71. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
72. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural ResourcesLaw, supra note 70, at
489.
73. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. at 456 (quoting Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842)).
74. 317 So.2d 576, modified on rehearing, 317 So.2d 580, 589 (1975).
75. 452 So.2d 1152 (La. 1984).
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art. VI, § 1 of the 1921 Louisiana Constitution,"76 and that the public
trust was "continued by the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, which
specifically lists air and water as natural resources."7' In addition to
these constitutional provisions, the Louisiana Civil Code provides that the
waters of natural navigable water bodies are public things that belong to
the state,7" and that such property is "dedicated to public use, and held
as a public trust, for public uses. "7 In Louisiana, therefore, the public
ownership of navigable waters has been firmly established within the
public trust doctrine.'
Avenal v. United States is inconsistent with Louisiana's public trust
doctrine because it indicates that some portion of the state's established
interest in its waters may be discontinued when a change in the physical
condition of public trust property can be characterized as an unintended
economic benefit resulting from a federal project. More specifically,
conflict arises because the navigable waters of the state were vested as
public property in the state of Louisiana when it achieved statehood in
1812,81 and this interest, either in part or in whole, is held subject only
to "'the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the general
government.'" '
Accordingly, the state of Louisiana should not be
divested of any portion of its interest in these waters absent an overriding
constitutional mechanism such as the navigation servitude." Furthermore, presence of the state's continuing public trust interest in its waters
undermines the court's factual determination that the state acquired no
interest in the altered salinity condition.

76. Id. at 1154 (citing LA. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (1921)).
77. Id. (citing LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1: "The natural resources of the state,
including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the
environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and

consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people.").
78. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 450 (West 1980). A portion of this article provides
that: "Public things that belong to the state are such as running waters, the waters and
bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, the territorial sea, and the seashore."
79. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 450, comment (b)(West 1980) (citing City of New
Orleans v. Carrollton Land Co., 60 So. 695, 696 (La. 1913)).
80. Wilkins & Wascom, supra note 70, at 868.
81. Id.
82. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
83. Morreale, supra note 45, at 19.
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V. CONCLUSION

The Avenal court improperly characterized the plaintiffs' alleged
property interest as an unintended benefit, pecuniary in its manifestation,
which allowed the court to essentially disregard the physical nature of the
altered salinity condition at issue. This misperception guided the court's
analysis, and ultimately directed the court to rest its holding upon a
factual inquiry. The resulting analysis determined that the state had no
interest in the altered salinity condition and thus conflicts with Louisiana's public trust doctrine, which has established that the waters of the
state are held in trust for the public. A more prudential outcome could
have been reached if the court had based its holding upon the navigation
servitude, under which the court could have avoided any potential
conflicts with the state's public trust interest in its coastal waters.'
Though the court properly dismissed the plaintiffs' takings claim, it did
so on the basis of an incomplete factual inquiry which disregarded the
state's continuing public trust interest in the physical characteristics of its
coastal waters.

84. The navigation servitude is limited in its operation to those interests affected
by the specific exercise of the navigation power at issue, e.g., the Caernarvon freshwater
diversion structure, and thus would not otherwise conflict with the state's public trust
interest in its coastal waters. Finnell, supra note 48, at 666.

